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ABSTRACT
A case-control, quasi-experimental study was designed (post-test only) to investigate the effect of a per-
formance-based incentive payment scheme on behaviours of public-sector service providers in delivering 
a basic package of maternal and child-health services in Egyptian primary healthcare units. The results 
showed significant improvements in the quality of family-planning, antenatal care, and child-care services 
as reported by women seen in clinics where the incentive payment scheme was in operation as measured 
by various indicators, including both technical and inter-personal communication content. An analysis of 
characteristics of the service providers and clients found no significant or meaningful differences between 
the study groups, and the facilities of both the study groups were essentially the same. Some findings are 
suggestive of other influences on behaviours of the service providers not captured by the data-collection 
instruments of the study. Subsequent to this study, the payment scheme has been rolled out to other dis-
tricts in Egypt.
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INTRODUCTION
There is an extensive literature on different types of 
payment methods for healthcare providers and the 
effects of incentives on organizations and individu-
als in the healthcare system (1,2). The evidence on 
incentive payments based upon specific perform-
ance criteria is generally mixed, though suggestive 
of several positive effects on the quality of care and, 
cost-containment measures. However, the findings 
in many settings are difficult to interpret as the 
introduction of payment reforms is often accom-
panied with other changes in the service-delivery 
setting that affect the quality of care. 
Incentives are known to elicit complex responses 
from physicians, inducing changes in the number 
of hours worked for the number of beneficiaries seen 
per hour, the location of their work, and the type 
of service provided to a patient (3,4). The introduc-
tion of incentive payments linked to the productivi- 
ty of the service provider can lead to over-valuing 
certain procedures or services, producing inefficien-
cies and unnecessary care. For example, payments 
made to clients, medical personnel, and outreach 
workers who motivate and refer clients for family 
planning have been a concern for national family-
planning programmes (5). In general, experience 
with the incentive payment schemes shows that 
they can lead to multiple impacts on behaviours 
of service provider—both intended and unintend-
ed—and must be carefully monitored (6-8). 
There are also other risks in the use of incentive pay-
ments. For example, performance-based incentive 
payment schemes increase the level of administra-
tive costs because these require data on the number 
and type of services provided and have been criti-
cized for these hidden costs (9,10). Thus, the success 
of an incentive payment system will depend upon 
the efficient operations of the financial and man-
agement systems that underpin the payments (11) 
and careful selection of the performance measures. Huntington D et al. Impact of provider incentive payment scheme
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Despite these other well-known difficulties and 
risks, payments of salary (either in part or whole) 
that are linked to performance measures are attrac-
tive policy options as a means to improving the 
quality of service and gaining efficiencies.  
Setting of study
Beginning in the middle of the 1990s, the Gov-
ernment of Egypt began to openly grapple with 
solutions to pressing problems that the piecemeal 
approach to reform used previously had failed to 
resolve.There were significant equity problems in 
access to services, by both income and geographi-
cal groupings, and public spending on health was 
regressive (12). The organization of the health 
sector and its management was burdened with a 
cumbersome mix of centralized and decentralized 
functions. Financing of the health sector was frag-
mented and uncoordinated, prohibiting effective 
risk-pooling and encouraging predatory behaviours 
among service providers. The delivery system was 
characterized by substantial excess capacity and 
under-use of sub-standard quality facilities. There 
were both surpluses and imbalances of medical 
personnel, with an over-supply of specialists, un-
der-supply of primary care physicians, and absolute 
shortage of nurses. 
The 1997 Health Sector Reform Strategy Paper 
responded to these challenges by setting a long-
term vision of universal coverage with basic 
health services for all citizens (13). The pilot phase 
(1998-2004) of the Egyptian Health Sector Reform 
Program (HSRP) focused on primary healthcare 
in a Family Health Project that modelled several 
basic reform principles, including creating a Fami- 
ly Health Fund (a social insurance scheme) to re-
duce out-of-pocket expenditure for a Basic Benefit 
Package that includes reproductive health services 
(family planning, maternal and newborn care) 
(14). 
At the close of the HSRP pilot phase, several im-
portant initiatives had been introduced (e.g. ba-
sic benefit package) while other reforms had not 
yet been evaluated. Among the later was a set of 
reforms targeting payments to healthcare provid-
ers that were developed in part a response to long 
overdue increases in salaries in the public sector 
and also as a means for improving the quality of 
care. Several types of payment reforms were be-
ing explored, including contracting mechanisms 
(both contracting-in and contracting-out for serv-
ices) using incentive payments linked to perform-
ance measures.  
Description of incentive payment scheme
The Family Health Fund works through the District 
Provider Organizations to contract with public and 
private providers to offer the Basic Benefit Package 
to the covered populations. Initially, the fund was 
designed to disburse payments on a per-capita basis 
system but this was soon put on hold as its imple-
mentation required substantial modifications to the 
existing procedures and policy that could not be 
achieved during the pilot phase. As a consequence, 
the Family Health Fund shifted towards the use of 
salary supplements in the form of incentive pay-
ments to encourage facilities to maintain certain 
operating standards and performance targets.  
Under this scheme, the incentive payments may 
reach up to 275% times the total base salaries of 
all personnel working in the Primary Health Center 
Unit (PHCU). The payments are metred according 
to performance measured against a set of standard-
ized indicators and rating criteria (14). The indica-
tors include both curative and preventive services, 
in addition to the quality of care-related indicators, 
e.g. completeness of medical records, satisfaction of 
patients, waiting-time, etc. Minimum target levels 
are set based on the national and Governorate pro-
gramme goals. The sources of data for the incentive 
payment scheme include both routinely-collected 
service statistics and datasets generated through 
clinic supervision visits made by the District Pro-
vider Organizations (which include exit-interviews 
with patients and facility-inspection checklists). No 
special data-collection activities or new indicators 
are used by the incentive payment scheme. 
The performance indicators are weighted differen-
tially to encourage service providers to give more 
attention to indicators of priority programmes, 
e.g. family planning and immunization. A nu-
meric score which forms the basis for calculating 
the actual amount of the incentive to be disbursed 
to each service provider according to a weighting 
system that differentiates between three categories 
of staff in each facility: healthcare providers (physi-
cians and nurses), administrative staff, and clerks. 
The incentive payment scheme was being phased 
into selected District Provider Organizations and 
PHCUs at the close of the HSRP pilot phase in 
2004. In settings where the incentive payment 
scheme was not being introduced, all service pro-
viders of the Ministry of Health and Population 
(MoHP) were receiving the same amount of sal-
ary supplement but as a top-off of their regular 
salary, i.e. not based on any performance assess-Huntington D et al. Impact of provider incentive payment scheme
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ment. This phased-in approach to implementing 
the incentive payment scheme created a natural 
experimental setting for studying the effects of the 
incentive payment compared to a flat-rate salary 
supplement.   
This study aimed at testing the hypothesis that 
providers who receive an incentive payment will 
provide better-quality services and be more respon-
sive to the healthcare needs of their clients than 
providers who receive a salary supplement that is 
not linked to performance.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Study design and sampling procedures
The study used a quasi-experimental post-test only 
comparison group design that tested the following 
hypothesis: Providers who receive the incentive 
payment will provide better-quality reproductive 
health services and be more responsive to the cli-
ents’ needs for reproductive healthcare than pro-
viders who received a salary supplement not linked 
to performance.
Results on indicators relating to the performance of 
service providers and patient outcomes in primary 
healthcare units where providers received incentive 
payments were compared with results from prima-
ry healthcare units where providers did not receive 
incentive payments but did receive an equivalent 
amount as salary top-off. The study included indi-
cators used by the incentive payment scheme and 
other measures of satisfaction of patients and quali- 
ty of clinic services. 
Two (Menoufia and Suhag) of the five Governo-
rates that piloted the incentive payment scheme 
were purposively selected for this study based upon 
considerations of location (Lower and Upper Egypt) 
and length of time that the payment scheme had 
been in place (e.g. more than 2 years). The two 
Governorates were selected because they each were 
working with District Provider Organizations (a 
feature of the health reform programme).
Within each Governorate, a single district recog-
nized as being the most active and engaged with 
the implementation of the HSRP was purposively 
selected for the study sample: El-Maragha health 
district in Suhag and Quesna health district in 
Menoufia. This was done to ensure the likelihood 
of finding the impact of the incentive payment 
scheme and to hold constant system-wide im-
provements that could influence the quality of care 
provided in the study sites. 
In each of the selected districts, all the PHCUs of-
fer the same basic benefit package of services and 
have taken part in all other elements of the HSRP 
to equal measure (e.g. all the PHCUs are fully ac-
credited and are similarly constructed, with com-
parable types of materials and medical equipment) 
but only some have been using the incentive pay-
ment scheme. The incentive payment clinics were 
somewhat better finished than the non-incentive 
payment PHCUs, e.g. a larger waiting-room and 
newer benches in the waiting-area. However, all the 
PHCUs in both the study groups were rated equal 
by the quality accreditation scheme of the MoHP. 
Thus, the most salient difference between the two 
types of PCHU in the study sample is the incentive 
payment scheme. The former units represent the 
frame for the intervention units of the study while 
the latter units are the frame for the comparison   
group. In total, four PHCUs were selected for the 
intervention group, and four PHCUs were selected 
for the comparison group. 
Within each of the selected PHCUs in each dis-
trict, all the clinic physicians were interviewed us-
ing semi-structured, qualitative discussion guides. 
The managers of the District Provider Organization 
were also interviewed. The study sampling frame 
included all consenting women of reproductive age 
(15-49 years) at the selected PHCUs. These inter-
views were conducted upon the patient’s exit from 
the clinic using a standardized quantitative ques-
tionnaire administered by a trained interviewer. 
Sample characteristics 
Eighty-one healthcare providers—52 in Menoufia 
Governorate and 29 in Suhag Governorate—were 
interviewed. Of them, 46 were males and 35 were 
females. Other than gender, there were no signifi-
cant differences in the professional or personal 
characteristics between the physicians in the in-
centive payment scheme sites and the compari-
son group, although physicians in the incentive 
payment sites were somewhat more likely to be 
younger and have a higher educational degree. Im-
portantly, there were no significant differences in 
the training programme experiences between the 
service providers in each study group. 
In total, 2,414 women were interviewed. Approxi-
mately, an equal number (600) was interviewed in 
each study group by Governorate (i.e. 600 cases, 
600 comparison group in each Governorate). Over-
all, there were no significant differences between 
the two study groups by age, educational level, 
working status, or education and working status of Huntington D et al. Impact of provider incentive payment scheme
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their husbands. There were significant differences 
(p<0.05) between the two study groups by age at 
first pregnancy, number of living children, number 
of living sons and girls, and previous history of mis-
carriage and by the wealth quintiles. For example, 
women in the incentive group were more likely to 
have had their first pregnancy at a later age, have 
fewer children, suffered fewer deaths of children, 
and be of slightly higher economic status (i.e. one 
group difference as shown by quintile analysis of 
wealth) than women in the comparison group.  
The volume of services seen in the study clinics 
during the 11-month period (January-November 
2006) before data collection was reviewed to detect 
any differences in case-load. The average number 
of reproductive health patients seen per month per 
PHCU was approximately twice as high in the non-
incentive payment scheme units (335 patients per 
month per clinic versus 184 patients per month 
per clinic, respectively). However, the number of 
consultations not related to reproductive health 
was higher in the incentive payment sites, result-
ing in no significant difference in the total number 
of consultations for all reasons between the two 
study groups. Anecdotal information collected dur-
ing the study suggests that the lower reproductive 
health case-load in the incentive group can be at-
tributed to the influence of a large general hospital 
in one Governorate located nearby the incentive 
payment scheme PHCU. The consultation fee at 
the hospital is one-third the cost of care at the in-
centive payment scheme PHCU. There are no other 
fees charged (for medicines or laboratory analyses), 
and clients are seen by a specialist doctor. A general 
practitioner sees clients in the incentive scheme 
units, and the fee includes only 50% of the pre-
scribed medicine cost.  
The primary reason for visiting the PHCU during 
the data-collection period of the study is shown 
in Table 1. Childcare was the most frequently-
used service in both incentive and non-incentive 
scheme units, as around half of the service users 
in each study group visited for childcare, followed 
by antenatal care and family-planning service. The 
incentive payment scheme units were somewhat 
more likely to provide family-planning and ante-
natal care services than the non-incentive payment 
scheme units, although the difference was not sig-
nificant.
RESULTS
The incentive payment scheme had a clear impact 
on the performance of family-planning care pro-
viders, with significant differences observed with 
regard to better history-taking, less laboratory inves-
tigations, more follow-up visits, and more informa-
tion about the available family-planning methods 
(Table 2). In addition, the family-planning clients 
in the incentive payment scheme units were sig-
nificantly more likely to report having assisted in 
the choice of the contraceptive method than the 
clients in the non-incentive payment sites. This 
is a critically-important indicator of the quality of 
care and has been associated with sustained use of 
family planning in other research (15-17). Some 
important differences between the Governorates 
emerged in the disaggregated results. In Menoufia, 
family-planning clients seen in clinics where the 
incentive scheme was operating were more likely 
to have a complete history taken, asked about the 
date of their last menstrual cycle, previous contra-
ceptive-use, and the history of past illness, among 
other indicators (Table 2). The experience in Suhag 
Governorate was inconclusive about the effects of 
Table 1. Reasons for seeking healthcare in the incentive and non-incentive primary healthcare units of 
the two Egyptian Governorates, Provider Incentive Payment Study, Egypt, 2007
Type of service
Menoufia* Suhag* Total†
Incentive 
scheme
(n=601)
Non-incen-
tive scheme 
(n=607)
Incentive 
scheme
(n=606)
Non-incen-
tive scheme
(n=600)
Incentive 
scheme
(n=1,207)
Non-incen-
tive scheme
(n=1,207)
Family planning 14.6 4.0 6.3 7.3 10.4 5.6
Antenatal care 16.1 8.6 14.0 10.5 15.1 9.5
Gynaecology 0.7 1.5 1.2 1.0 0.9 1.2
Childcare 55.7 68.0 45.7 43.5 50.7 55.8
Others** 12.8 18.0 32.8 37.7 22.9 27.8
*Menoufia incentive units: Begeram and Mastai; Menoufia non-incentive units: Kafr Bani Gheriyan 
and Ta Shubr; Suhag incentive units: Nage Helal and Nage Tayee; and Suhag non-incentive units: 
Banaweet and Nage Tammam; †The differences in proportions between incentive and non-incentive 
schemes in Menoufia and total reached statistical significance (p<0.05); **Others: healthcare services 
other than reproductive and child-healthcare servicesHuntington D et al. Impact of provider incentive payment scheme
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the incentive payment scheme on the same indica-
tors. This could be attributed to the lower case-load 
of family-planning clients in the Suhag study sites 
due to the presence of nearby hospitals (mentioned 
previously).  
The incentive payment scheme had several positive 
effects on the quality of child healthcare services, 
which was the most common reason for having 
visited the PHCU during the study. In total, 1,286 
women attended the selected units to obtain care 
for a child during the study (not shown in Table 3). 
The age of the children seeking healthcare ranged 
from less than one month to 15 years and was not 
different between the two study groups, or by Gov-
ernorate. Forty-five percent of the children were 
suffering from an upper respiratory tract infection 
(any child with fever suffering from cough and/or 
sore throat and/or difficulty in breathing). Eruptive 
infectious diseases were the second common cause 
for seeking care (fever with skin eruption), followed 
by diarrhoea (with or without fever and with no 
symptoms of upper respiratory tract infection).
The results presented in Table 3 show an apparent 
tendency towards better childcare practices in the 
incentive scheme PHCUs than the non-incentive 
scheme PHCUs. The care providers in the incen-
tive scheme PHCUs were more likely to request for 
follow-up than those in the non-incentive scheme 
PHCUs and are less likely to prescribe medicines 
but when they did prescribe they were more likely 
to administer injections immediately. Carefully 
monitoring a child through follow-up coupled 
with the less-frequent use of medication can lead 
to a reduction in the practice of over-prescription. 
Mothers of the children in the incentive scheme 
sites were more likely to report having received 
clear instructions on how to care for the sick child 
than those in the non-incentive scheme sites.  
These results are shown in both the Governorates 
and in the study’s overall results.
In general, there were clear results, suggesting 
several positive impacts of the incentive scheme 
payments on antenatal care (Table 4). The ante-
natal care patients in the incentive scheme were 
Table 2. Family-planning care offered to women in the incentive and non-incentive primary healthcare 
units of the two Egyptian Governorates, Provider Incentive Payment Study, Egypt, 2007
Menoufia Suhag Total
Parameter
Incentive 
scheme
(n=88)
Non-in-
centive 
scheme 
(n=20)
Incentive 
scheme
(n=28)
Non-in-
centive 
scheme 
(n=41)
Incentive 
scheme
(n=116)
Non-in-
centive 
scheme 
(n=61)
History-taking
Name 83.0 65.0 71.4 70.7 80.2 68.9
Age 65.9 55.0 67.9 68.3 66.4 63.9
Parity 64.8 50.0 67.9 58.5 65.5 55.7
Date of last menses* 69.3 40.0 71.4 61.0 69.8 54.1
Previous contraception† 61.4 30.0 75.0 61.0 64.7 50.8
History of past illness† 63.6 20.0 67.9 65.9 64.7 50.8
Medical examination            
Palpation of breast 5.7 0.0 17.9 22.0 8.6 14.8
Vaginal examination 9.1 5.0 25.0 9.8 12.9 8.2
Investigation             
Laboratory investigation* 3.4 35.0 35.7 22.0 11.2 26.2
Family-planning follow-up**          
Asked to return* 75.0 50.0 69.6 63.4 73.9 59.0
*The differences in proportions  between incentive and non-incentive schemes in Menoufia and Total 
reached statistical significance (p<0.05); †The differences in proportions between incentive and non-
incentive schemes in Menoufia reached statistical significance (p<0.05); **The total number of cases who 
were asked about family-planning follow-up in the Suhag incentive scheme PHCUs was 23 as five cases 
left the PHCU without using contraception method. The total number of incentive scheme beneficiaries 
was 111 womenHuntington D et al. Impact of provider incentive payment scheme
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Table 3. Type of childcare services provided  in incentive and non-incentive primary healthcare units
Type of care
Menoufia Suhag Total
Incentive 
scheme
(n=328)
Non- 
incentive 
scheme 
(n=413)
Incentive 
scheme
(n=273)
Non- 
incentive 
scheme 
(n=259)
Incentive 
scheme
(n=601)
Non- 
incentive 
scheme 
(n=672)
Prescribed treatment  92.4 99.5 91.9 96.1 92.2 98.2
Received injection  8.8 a 2.2 9.5 14.3 9.2 6.8
Follow-up   52.1
(n=303)
23.7
 (n=411)
58.2
(n=251)
41.7
(n=249)
54.9
 (n=554)
30.7
(n=660)
Child given medicine  11.9 5.6 29.9 16.1 20.0 9.5
Explained medicine  96.4 88.6 95.2 78.3 95.8 84.7
Women knew medicine-use  99.0 90.3 99.6 82.3 99.3 87.3
All differences are significant at p<0.05
Table 4. Antenatal care offered to women in incentive and non-incentive primary healthcare units of 
two Egyptian Governorates
Parameter
Menoufia Suhag Total
Incentive 
scheme
(n=97)
Non- 
incentive 
scheme 
(n=52)
Incentive 
scheme
(n=85)
Non- 
incentive 
scheme 
(n=63)
Incentive 
scheme
(n=182)
Non- 
incentive 
scheme
(n=115) 
History-taking            
   Name 96.9 96.2 94.1 87.3 95.6 91.3
   Age 96.9 94.2 96.5 90.5 96.7 92.2
   Parity  92.8 b 
80.8 91.8 81.0 92.3 a
80.9
Date of last menses 95.9 90.4 94.1 93.7 95.1 92.2
History of past illness  89.7
a
57.7
83.5 81.0 86.8 a
70.4
Examination            
   Weight 92.8 88.5 96.5 88.9 94.5 88.7
Blood pressure  94.8 b
84.6 97.6 90.5 96.2
a
87.8
 Foetal heart rate  12.4 3.8 61.2 b 41.3 35.2 24.3
Investigations            
   Blood test  84.5 a
63.5 92.9 87.3 88.5 a
76.5
   Urine analysis  72.2 a
28.8 96.5 92.1 83.5
a
63.5
Management            
   Tetanus toxoid  59.8 a
80.8 45.9 46.0 53.3 61.7
   Iron 54.6 65.4 52.9 61.9 53.8 63.5
   Vitamins 38.1 25.0 56.5 55.6 46.7 41.7
   Treatment 17.5 13.5 35.3 46.0 25.8 31.3
Note: statistical significant for differences by Governorate and combined are denoted by a: p<0.01; b: 
0.01<p<0.05 for indicators  
significantly more likely to have a complete medi- 
cal history taken, undergo more complete exami-
nation, and laboratory tests made than in the 
non-incentive scheme clinics. The exception was 
tetanus toxoid (TT), which was actually lower in 
the incentive payment scheme clinics in Menou-
fia than in the non-incentive payment scheme 
sites. This may be because the care providers in 
the non-incentive payment scheme were less 
likely to retrieve or consult the medical files of Huntington D et al. Impact of provider incentive payment scheme
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the patients (e.g. to check if a TT immunization 
was needed) than care providers in the incentive 
payment scheme group (results not shown in Ta-
ble 4).
The incentive scheme had an impact on behav-
iours of the doctors who were significantly less 
likely than their colleagues in the non-incentive 
scheme clinics to prescribe unnecessary medicines, 
more likely to take a full history (and to record it in 
a medical file), and more likely to ask their patients 
if they had any questions and encourage them to 
return for a follow-up.
The results of the interviews with the physicians in 
the PHCU and the district healthcare officers (Dis-
trict Provider Organization) revealed mixed feed-
back on the design and functioning of the incen-
tive payment scheme. The main highlights of these 
views were as follows:
Too many indicators were used in the calcula-
tion of the incentive, and the level of details 
was overly micro in focus.
The indicators were established by national-
level decision-makers without consulting local 
administration. This caused many problems 
during the implementation as both district-
and facility-level care providers needed time 
to understand the construction of the payment 
scheme and the rationale for using the selected 
indicators.
Calculations of percentage of the incentive and 
reasons of its reduction were not clear to most 
physicians, reflecting an overly-detailed ap-
proach.
The delays in receiving incentives created an 
atmosphere of distrust and uncertainty.
The phased introduction of the scheme caused 
some confusion with the overall management 
of the district—different approaches should be 
adopted for launching the scheme.
DISCUSSION
The incentive scheme improved those things 
which scored points in the scheme, such as 
record-keeping (which was significantly better 
in the incentivised clinics) and the non-clinical 
aspects  of  behaviours  of  doctors,  such  as  the 
clarity  of  their  communication  and  listening 
to their clients. Although improvements in the 
quality of care were associated with the intro-
duction of the incentive scheme, the study also 
showed overall low levels of quality in both the 
study groups, e.g. women reporting clear com-
munication with the care providers. Sustained 
attention is required for the continual improve-
ment of quality of service, and greater efforts are 
needed for consumer education that will em-
power patients with skills to gather the type of 
information needed to ensure compliance and 
the sustained use of contraceptive methods. 
Contextual differences also emerged in the find-
ings of the study, indicating the limitations of an 
incentive payment scheme in overcoming exter-
nal influences on behaviours of the care provid-
ers  or  how  management  and  supervision  may 
also exert an influence on behaviours of the care 
providers. For example, for many key quality-of-
care indicators, the clinics in Suhag Governorate 
scored higher than those in Menoufia, regard-
less of whether they were or not in the incentive 
scheme. These differences between the Governo-
rates are suggestive of other factors influencing 
behaviours of the care providers beyond the in-
centive payments. The study did not explore the 
possibility of how the incentive payment scheme 
may have changed the overall configuration of 
services, perhaps leading to a ‘crowding-out’ of 
other, non-incentivized services which can occur 
as the providers focus on services that are linked 
to the incentive payments and not on other, 
non-incentivised services.  
Although the doctors and managers were support-
ive of the incentive payment scheme, they com-
plained that they were not fully consulted during 
its design. Consequently, they felt that the scheme 
was too complicated and that the weights given to 
different indicators were changed too often.  
The results from the early introduction of the 
incentive payment scheme in Egypt are highly 
suggestive that the care providers do respond 
to incentives that are carefully integrated into 
a well-known and established quality of the care-
monitoring system. Although the introduction 
of the new payment scheme was cumbersome 
for the district officials and caused confusion 
for the physicians working in the scheme’s sites, 
overall, the experience has been positive. The in-
centive payment scheme continues to be used in 
Egypt, expanding into other Governorates as an 
important element of the national health-sector 
reform programme.
REFERENCES
1.  Christianson J, Leatherman S, Sutherland K. Finan-
cial incentives, healthcare providers and quality Huntington D et al. Impact of provider incentive payment scheme
JHPN 280
improvements: a review of the evidence. London: 
Health Foundation, 2007. 109 p.
2.  Roberts MJ, Hsiao W, Berman P, Reich MR. Getting 
health reform right: a guide to improving perform-
ance and equity. New York, NY: Oxford University 
Press, 2004. 332 p.
3.  Hicks V, Adams O. The effects of economic and poli- 
cy incentives on provider practice. Geneva: World 
Health Organization, 2000. 48 p. (Issues in health 
services delivery no. 5) (WHO/EPI/OSD/00.8). 
4.  Petersen LA, Woodard LD, Urech T, Daw C, Sookanan 
S. Does pay-for-performance improve the quality of 
health care?  Ann Intern Med 2006;145:265-72.
5.  Cleland J, Mauldin P. The promotion of family plan-
ning by financial payments: the case of Bangladesh.   
Stud Fam Plann 1991;22:1-18.
6.  Canavan A, Toonen J, Elovainio R. Performance based 
financing: an international review of the literature. 
Amsterdam, AD: KIT Development Policy & Practice, 
2008. 24 p. 
7.  Hayford K. Review of alternative compensation 
methods for health workers. In: Vujicic M, Ohiri K, 
Sparkles S. Working in health: financing and manag-
ing the public sector health workforce. Washington, 
DC: World Bank, 2009:233-52.
8.  Data for decision making project. Cost analysis and 
efficiency indicators for health care. Boston, MA: Har-
vard University Press, 1997. 194 p. (Report no. 4).
9.  Kohn A. Punished by rewards: the trouble with gold 
stars, incentive plans, A’s, praise and other bribes.   
Boston, MA: Mariner Books, 1999. 448 p.
10. England R. Experiences of contracting with the pri-
vate sector: a selective review. London: DFID Health 
Systems Resource Centre, 2004. 54 p.
11. Wouters A. Alternative provider payment methods: 
incentives for improving health care delivery. Bethes-
da, MD: Partnerships for Health Reform, 1999. 12 p. 
(PHR primer for policymaker).
12. El-Saharty S, Richardson G, Chase S. Egypt and the 
Millennium Development Goals: challenges and op-
portunities. Washington, DC: World Bank, 2005.  67 
p. (Health, nutrition and population discussion pa-
per).
13. Egypt. Ministry of Health and Population. Basic 
health care working guide. Cairo: Ministry of Health 
and Population, Government of Egypt, 1999. 
14. Egypt. Ministry of Health and Population. Central 
Department for Technical Support and Projects. Fami- 
ly health facility implementation manual. Version 2. 
Cairo: Ministry of Health and Population, Govern-
ment of Egypt, 2004.
15. Pariani S, Heer DM, Van Arsdol MD, Jr. Does choice 
make a difference to contraceptive use? Evidence 
from east Java. Stud Fam Plann 1991;22:384-90.
16. Bertrand JT, Hardee K, Magnani RJ, Angle MA. Access, 
quality of care and medical barriers in family plan-
ning programs. Int Family Plann Perspect 1995;21:64-
74.
17. Greenspan A. Adding choice to the contraceptive 
mix: lessons from Indonesia. Asia Pac Pop Policy 
1991:1-4.